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1 
CURBING “UNBRIDLED DISCRETION”: 
THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF 
PATEL v. LOS ANGELES ON HOTEL 
OWNERS AND THEIR PATRONS 
KEVIN BERGIN* 
Abstract: In Patel v. City of Los Angeles, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit struck down Los Angeles Municipal Code section 41.49, which author-
ized warrantless, on-site search and seizure of hotel and motel guest registries. In 
doing so, the majority recognized that in the absence of a warrant, an administra-
tive record inspection scheme must provide the opportunity for pre-compliance 
judicial review of the search’s reasonableness. By recognizing section 41.49’s 
lack of pre-compliance review, the majority took a step to curb police officers’ 
arbitrary, unmonitored application of the statute. In turn, this will provide a disin-
centive for targeting guests without probable cause, as officers no longer have di-
rect, uncontested access to hotel registries. In granting certiorari and hearing the 
case, the Supreme Court should recognize the extent to which this revision serves 
to prevent arbitrary police searches. 
INTRODUCTION 
Los Angeles Municipal Code (“L.A.M.C.”) section 41.49 requires that 
hotel and motel owners create and maintain registries containing specified in-
formation about their guests.1 Additionally, L.A.M.C. section 41.49(3)(a) au-
thorizes warrantless, on-site inspections of these records at the demand of any 
police officer as part of an administrative record inspection scheme.2 Motel 
owners Naranjibhai Patel and Ramilaben Patel challenged the constitutional 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2014–2015. 
 1 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49 (2008); Patel v. City of Los Angeles (Patel II), 738 F.3d 1058, 
1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 400 (2014). The Supreme Court heard oral 
argument on this case on March 3, 2015. See generally Oral Argument, Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 
(No. 13-1175), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2014/2014_13_1175. 
 2 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49(3)(a); Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1060. Generally, the concept of an 
administrative record inspection involves the inspection of statutorily mandated records for highly 
regulated businesses. See Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1063. According to the Patel court, “[t]he government 
may ordinarily compel the inspection of business records only through an inspection demand ‘suffi-
ciently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be 
unreasonably burdensome.’” Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1064 (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 
544 (1967)); see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967)) (“[I]n the regulatory field, our cases have recognized the importance of 
‘prompt inspections, even without a warrant, . . . in emergency situations.’”). 
2 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:E. Supp. 
validity of section 41.49’s warrantless inspection provision after three inci-
dents involving unpermitted entrances into their motel, inspection and seizure 
of their records, and Naranjibhai and Ramilaben’s arrest for violating the ordi-
nance.3 Specifically, the Patels argued that the ordinance permitted unreasona-
ble search and seizure of their private business records in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.4 
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California rejected the 
Patels’ claim, reasoning that the Patels did not maintain a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in these records.5 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the warrantless inspection provision was facially 
invalid and unconstitutional.6 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit differentiated its 
analysis from the lower court by acknowledging that the records covered by 
section 41.49 were the Patel’s private property.7 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the motel retained an expectation of privacy in these records, not-
withstanding their legally mandated creation.8 
Central to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, however, was the conclusion that 
section 41.49 did not allow the opportunity for pre-compliance judicial review, 
which the court noted as a requirement in an administrative record inspection 
                                                                                                                           
 3 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49(3)(a); Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1060; Patel v. City of Los Angeles 
(Patel I), CV 05-1571 DSF (AJWx), 2008 WL 4382755, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008), aff’d, 686 
F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d and remanded en banc, 738 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 
135 S. Ct. 400 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2014) (No. 13-1175); First Amended Complaint for Damages and De-
claratory and Injunctive Relief at 4–5, Patel I, No. CV 05-1571 DSF (AJWx) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s 
Complaint]. Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.49(3)(a) provides, in full, the following: 
The record shall be kept on the hotel premises in the guest reception or guest check-in 
area or in an office adjacent to that area. The record shall be maintained at that location 
on the hotel premises for a period of 90 days from and after the date of the last entry in 
the record and shall be made available to any officer of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment for inspection. Whenever possible, the inspection shall be conducted at a time and 
in a manner that minimizes any interference with the operation of the business. 
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49(3)(a). The Patels were arrested and charged with a misdemeanor for 
failure to comply with the statute. See Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra, at 4–5; see also L.A., CAL., MUN. 
CODE § 11.00(m) (stating that code violations are punishable as a misdemeanor, carrying up to six 
months in prison and up to a one thousand dollar fine); Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1061. 
 4 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1060, 1061; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides 
in relevant part that persons maintain the right to be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” unless there is the issuance of a warrant upon 
probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In their initial complaint, the Patels contended that when 
relying on section 41.49 for warrantless searches, the police must provide a set of minimum guidelines 
specifying where the police may conduct the inspection, whether they are allowed to enter into the 
owner’s private residence, and for what period the motel owners are obligated to keep the records 
open for inspection. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 7–8; see L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49. 
 5 Patel I, 2008 WL 4382755, at *3. 
 6 See Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1063–64, 1065. 
 7 See id. at 1061. 
 8 Id. 
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scheme.9 As a result, the majority opinion held that without this procedural 
element “there are no circumstances in which the record-inspection provision 
[of section 41.49] may be constitutionally applied.”10 In addition, the majority 
addressed the two dissenting opinions, stating that exigent circumstances 
would have justified a non-consensual search regardless of whether or not sec-
tion 41.49 existed as a statute. 11 
This Comment argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should uphold the de-
cision of the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit’s decision has two favorable 
consequences: (1) it curbs unmonitored police discretion in the field, thereby 
preventing discriminatory application of section 41.49 against minority and 
immigrant motel owners, and (2) the majority’s decision indirectly protects 
hotel patrons’ privacy by providing a disincentive for police to target individu-
als without evidence of criminal conduct. Accordingly, the decision advances 
the protection of Fourth Amendment rights of individuals, and should be rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court upon review. 
I. THE PATELS, THE REGISTRY REQUIREMENT, AND  
UNCHECKED POLICE SEIZURE 
Naranjibhai and Ramilaben Patel owned and operated the Rio Palace Mo-
tor Inn in Los Angeles, California.12 They resided at the motel and served as 
the facility’s on-site managers.13 As motel operators, Los Angeles Municipal 
Code (“L.A.M.C.”) section 41.49 required that the Patels keep detailed infor-
mation about their guests in either electronic or paper form.14 For guests who 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See id. at 1063–64; see, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
 10 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1065. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 2. 
 13 Id. 
 14 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49 (2008); Patel v. City of Los Angeles (Patel II), 738 F.3d 1058, 
1060–61 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 400 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2014) (No. 13-1175). 
According to legislative history, the statute was designed as a nuisance abatement measure intended to 
counteract the use of hotels and motels for “shelter[ing] parole violators and fugitives and provid[ing] 
bases of operation for criminal enterprises, such as prostitution, manufacturing of forged identity doc-
uments and trafficking in illegal narcotics . . . .” See L.A., CAL., ORDINANCE 177966 (Dec. 2, 2006). 
The logic behind the statute was that obtaining specific personal information at check-in would deter 
individuals from using hotels for criminal activities because the persons involved could be readily 
identified through the registration records. Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1060–63. Accordingly, the law re-
quires that the records contain: 
the guest’s name and address; the number of people in the guest’s party; the make, 
model, and license plate number of the guest’s vehicle if the vehicle will be parked on 
hotel property; the guest’s date and time of arrival and scheduled date of departure; the 
room number assigned to the guest; the rate charged and the amount collected for the 
room; and the method of payment . . .  .For cash-paying and walk-in guests, as well as 
any guest who rents a room for less than twelve hours, the records must also contain the 
number and expiration date of the identification document the guest presented when 
4 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:E. Supp. 
paid in cash, booked a room as a walk-in, or rented a room for less than twelve 
hours, the statute required that the records contain more personal information, 
such as the number and expiration date of the identification document present-
ed at check-in.15 The ordinance further specified that hotel operators must keep 
these records “on the hotel premises in the guest reception or guest check-in 
area or in an office adjacent to that area” for ninety days and that owners must 
turn over these registries upon the demand of any police officer for a warrant-
less, on-site inspection.16 The statute treated non-compliance with an officer’s 
inspection demand as a misdemeanor, punishable by up to six months in jail 
and a one thousand dollar fine.17 
On three occasions, Los Angeles Police Department officers conducted 
warrantless motel registration checks on the Patels’ facility pursuant to section 
41.49(3)(a).18 These searches were conducted at random hours of the night 
without notice or warning, and involved entrance into the Patels’ private family 
quarters.19 In addition, the officers threatened the Patels with further unan-
nounced searches.20 During each incident, the officers entered the motel and 
the Patel residence without their consent and without judicial authorization, an 
administrative warrant, or a court order.21 The officers inspected and seized the 
motel’s registrations cards and arrested Ramilaben Patel on the first occasion 
and Naranjibhai Patel on the second for violating section 41.49(b)—
specifically for failure to maintain a register.22 The citations from each inci-
dent, however, were eventually dismissed and no charges were ever filed.23 
Following these incidents, the Patels sought declaratory and injunctive re-
lief in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to invalidate 
                                                                                                                           
checking in . . . . For guests who check in using an electronic kiosk, hotel operators 
must record the guest’s name, reservation and credit card information, and the room 
number assigned to the guest . . . . These records must be “kept on the hotel premises in 
the guest reception or guest check-in area or in an office adjacent to that area” for a pe-
riod of 90 days . . . .” 
Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1060, (citing L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49(2)(a)–(b), (4)). In regards to the 
actual storing of this information, the Patel II opinion used the terms “records,” “registry infor-
mation,” and “registration cards” synonymously. See id. at 1060, 1062, 1073. 
 15 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1060. 
 16 Id. at 1062; see L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49(3)(a). 
 17 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 11.00(m), 41.49; Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1061. 
 18 Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 4–5; see L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49. 
 19 Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 4–6; see L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49 (2008). 
 20 Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 12–13; see L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49. 
 21 Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 12–13; see L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49. 
 22 Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
 23 Id. No information was provided in either the Plaintiff’s Complaint or the Patel court opinions 
explaining why these charges were ultimately dropped. See Patel v. City of Los Angeles (Patel I), CV 
05-1571 DSF (AJWx), 2008 WL 4382755, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008) aff’d, 686 F.3d 1085 (9th 
Cir. 2012) rev’d and remanded en banc, 738 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 400 
(U.S. Oct. 20, 2014) (No. 13-1175). See generally Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3. 
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section 41.49’s warrantless inspection provision.24 The Patels did not contest 
the mandated creation of these records.25 Rather, they asserted that the statute 
was facially invalid as it violated, in every circumstance, a person’s right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure.26 
After a bench trial, the district court rejected the Patels’ Fourth Amend-
ment challenge.27 In particular, the court did not believe that hotel or motel 
owners have a sufficient ownership or possessory interest in guest registers, 
which is necessary to give rise to Fourth Amendment protections.28 Further-
more, the district court rejected the Patels’ argument that these registries con-
stituted business records that may be used for other private purposes.29 In con-
clusion, the court noted that nothing prevented the Patels from creating their 
own set of records containing the same information in another location, which 
would not be subject to inspection.30 
The Patels appealed the district court’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit.31 Sit-
ting en banc, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s finding, and held 
that that the warrantless, on-site inspection provision of section 41.49 was fa-
cially insufficient and, therefore, unconstitutional.32 
II. PROTECTION OF HOTEL AND MOTEL OWNERS THROUGH MANDATORY 
PRE-COMPLIANCE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A PROPOSED SEARCH 
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court’s decision 
and held that the warrantless, on-site inspection provision of section 41.49 was 
unconstitutional.33 Judge Paul J. Watford, writing for the court, first established 
that the police officer’s nonconsensual inspection of hotel guest records under 
section 41.49 constituted a Fourth Amendment search.34 In reaching this con-
clusion, the majority evaluated whether the Patels either possessed a property-
based interest or maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in their rec-
                                                                                                                           
 24 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1061; Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 12–13; see U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. 
 25 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1061; see Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 12–13. 
 26 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1061; Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 12–13; see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV (protecting against unreasonable search and seizure of an individual’s property). 
 27 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1061. 
 28 Id. at 1058. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 1065. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Patel v. City of Los Angeles (Patel II), 738 F.3d 1058, 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), 
cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 400 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2014) (No. 13-1175). 
 34 Id. at 1061. As Judge Watford explained, “[a] search occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes 
when the government physically intrudes upon one of [the Amendment’s] enumerated areas, or in-
vades a protected privacy interest, for the purpose of obtaining information.” Id. 
6 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:E. Supp. 
ords.35 He then inquired into whether the search was reasonable and deter-
mined that, absent a statutory provision for pre-compliance judicial review of a 
warrantless search, all such searches conducted under the statute were uncon-
stitutional.36 
A. Traditional Fourth Amendment Analysis: Property-Based Interests, the 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, and Exceptions to the Warrant 
Requirement 
The majority opinion held that the Patels’ claim would have been a suffi-
cient Fourth Amendment challenge under either the Jones property-based 
standard or the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.37 Specifically, the 
court noted that business records are considered papers under the Fourth 
Amendment, meaning the Patels maintained certain property-based interests in 
those records.38 The court further explained that “[o]ne of the main rights at-
taching to property is the right to exclude others, and [that] one who owns or 
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.”39 In the majority’s 
view, the Patels’ right to exclude others from their records served as the foun-
dation of their expectation of privacy under a Katz analysis.40 The court 
viewed this expectation of privacy as reasonable because “businesses do not 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. The property-based approach and the reasonable expectation of privacy test are, respective-
ly, the historical and contemporary analytical frameworks for Fourth Amendment challenges. United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012). The reasonable expectation of privacy standard was first 
articulated in Katz v. United States, where the Supreme Court modernized Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence by acknowledging that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” 389 U.S. 347, 
351 (1967) (expanding the scope of the Fourth Amendment protections); id. at 361 (Harlan, J., con-
curring) (providing the analytical framework for understanding the Fourth Amendment). In recogniz-
ing this personal protection, later courts applied the analysis from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
what became known as the “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). According to Justice Harlan, “[t]he rule that has 
emerged from prior decisions [contains a] twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). More than fifty 
years later, the Court in Jones revived the property-based analysis for Fourth Amendment challenges. 
See 132 S. Ct. at 952; Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Writing for the Court in Jones, Justice Scalia explained 
that “[f]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern 
for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates. Katz did 
not repudiate that understanding.” 132 S. Ct. at 950. As a result, “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Id. at 952. 
 36 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1063, 1065. 
 37 Id. at 1061. See generally Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (discussing property-based analysis of Fourth 
Amendment violations); Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (establishing Fourth Amendment violation where no 
physical intrusion on property). 
 38 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1061. 
 39 Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)). 
 40 Id. 
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ordinarily disclose, and are not expected to disclose, the kind of commercially 
sensitive information contained in the records . . . .”41 
Additionally, Judge Watford carefully noted that this expectation of priva-
cy did not extend to the hotel’s guests, because “the records belong to the ho-
tel, not the guest, and the records contain information that the guests have vol-
untarily disclosed to the hotel.”42 As support for this conclusion, the court cited 
United States v. Cormier, an earlier Ninth Circuit case where the court rejected 
a motel guest’s similar Fourth Amendment challenge to a police officer’s sei-
zure of the motel’s guest registration records.43 
B. Applying the Reasonability Standard and the Necessity of Pre-
Compliance Judicial Review 
After establishing both the Patels’ property and privacy interest in the 
records, the court next considered whether the searches authorized by section 
41.49 were reasonable.44 Traditionally, this analysis requires balancing “the 
need to search against the invasion which the search entails.”45 Judge Watford 
distinguished section 41.49, however, as a statute authorizing administrative 
record inspections and not searches for evidence of a crime.46 This characteri-
zation is significant, because administrative record inspections do not general-
ly require the issuance of a warrant.47 In the absence of a warrant, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. at 1062. The majority also noted that “[t]he hotel retains that expectation of privacy not-
withstanding the fact that the records are required to be kept by law.” Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id.; United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). In United States v. Cormi-
er, a police officer acquired motel records through a similar Washington State statute mandating that 
guest registries be turned over upon police request. 220 F.3d at 1106, 1108. The hotel owner voluntar-
ily surrendered the registry to the officer, who then ran a background check on the list of occupants. 
See id. at 1106. Through this background check, the officer learned that one of the residents had an 
extensive criminal history and was a registered sex offender. Id. at 1107. The officer conducted a 
“knock and talk” on this individual, and afterwards searched his room with his consent. See id. In the 
process, the officer discovered a gun, and the individual was charged with being a felon in possession 
of a firearm. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge to the sei-
zure of the records on the grounds that the defendant, as a guest, did not have any privacy interest in 
information he voluntarily turned over to a third party. Id. at 1108. 
 44 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1063. 
 45 Id. (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967)). 
 46 Id. The City of Los Angeles characterized section 41.49 as a “nuisance abatement measure 
designed to deter drug dealing and prostitution,” by creating records that identify patrons. Id. Specifi-
cally, the City asserted—and the plaintiffs accepted—that “those who would be inclined to use hotels 
to facilitate their illicit activities will be less inclined to do so if they know that hotel operators must 
collect—and make available to the police—information identifying each of their guests.” Id. Conse-
quently, section 41.49 permitted only inspection of the records to ensure compliance with the statute. 
Id. This distinction is important, as searches for evidence of a crime ordinarily require the issuance of 
a warrant. Id. 
 47 Id. The Court has noted the limits of the warrant requirement when dealing with highly regulat-
ed industries. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981). For example, the Court has stated: 
8 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:E. Supp. 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires that the statute provide an oppor-
tunity for pre-compliance judicial review, at the very least.48 
Los Angeles Municipal Code section 41.49 lacked a specific provision 
that granted this pre-compliance judicial review in situations where police 
sought to conduct a warrantless search.49 Consequently, Judge Watford con-
cluded that all searches authorized by section 41.49 are unreasonable, allowing 
for “no circumstances in which the record-inspection provision may be consti-
tutionally applied.”50 Judge Watford stressed that the pre-compliance mecha-
nism provides the targeted party an opportunity to obtain judicial review of the 
demand’s reasonableness prior to suffering the penalties for refusing to com-
ply.51 Without such a safeguard, hotel operators are subjected to the “‘unbri-
dled discretion’ of officers in the field, who are free to choose whom to in-
spect, when to inspect, and the frequency with which those inspections oc-
cur.”52 The Ninth Circuit therefore held the municipal code to be facially un-
constitutional.53 
C. Judge Tallman’s Dissent: Meeting the Requisite Burden of Proof for a 
Facial-Invalidity Challenge 
In his dissent, Judge Richard C. Tallman argued that the court record was 
not sufficiently complete to examine the Patels’ facial-invalidity challenge.54 
According to Judge Tallman, it would have been more appropriate for the Pa-
tels to raise an as-applied constitutional challenge—especially because prece-
dent required a case-by-case analysis on the validity of each warrantless 
search.55 Instead, Judge Tallman contended that the majority engaged in an 
                                                                                                                           
[A] warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably deter-
mined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the 
federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of 
commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to peri-
odic inspections undertaken for specific purposes. 
Id. 
 48 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1063. In an administrative record inspection 
scheme, pre-compliance judicial review refers to the opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of a 
warrantless search before the targeted party complies with the demand. Id. at 1064. The policy behind 
such review is to afford judicial discretion to cut down on arbitrary searches. Id. 
 49 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1063–64. 
 50 Id. at 1065. 
 51 Id. at 1064. 
 52 Id. (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978)). 
 53 Id. at 1060. 
 54 Id. at 1065 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 55 Id. at 1065–66. Specifically, Judge Tallman quoted Sibron v. New York, which held that “[t]he 
constitutional validity of a warrantless search is preeminently the sort of question which can only be 
decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case.” Id. (quoting 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968)). 
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“abstract and unproductive exercise,” and the court should have confined its 
inquiry to the facts and circumstances that actually occurred.56 
Additionally, Judge Tallman criticized the majority for failing to 
acknowledge the established rule that a statute survives a facial challenge “if a 
court can find any circumstance in which [the ordinance] could constitutional-
ly be applied. “57 He suggested that several exceptions to the warrant require-
ment could have been relied on to uphold the ordinance.58 For example, the 
exigent-circumstances exception and the community-caretaking exception 
would both have permitted seizure of the hotel records without a warrant.59 
Tallman concluded his dissent by noting that nothing prevented the police from 
obtaining a warrant to carry out a search.60 As a result, Tallman argued the 
statute was valid when analyzed under this standard procedure.61 
III. THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF CURBING  
“UNBRIDLED DISCRETION” 
The Supreme Court should uphold Judge Watford’s holding because it 
would have a beneficial effect for both hotel owners and their clientele—
                                                                                                                           
 56 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1065–66 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 59). 
 57 Id. at 1067. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.; see United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court has 
held that “[o]ne well-recognized exception applies when the ‘exigencies of the situation’ make the 
needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 
437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)). In regards to the community caretaking exception, “[t]he Supreme Court 
recognized that, by necessity, local police officers often must ‘engage in what, for want of a better 
term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, inves-
tigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.’” Erickson, 991 F.2d 
at 531 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). If police officers are acting within 
their capacity as a community caretaker, a warrant may not be required for a search or seizure. Id.; 
see, e.g., Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that under the com-
munity caretaking exception, police officers may impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety and 
efficient movement of vehicular traffic). 
 60 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1068 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 61 Id. at 1066. Judge Clifton, also dissenting, criticized the majority for ignoring the strict burden of 
proof in facial invalidity challenges. Id. at 1070 (Clifton, J., dissenting). Judge Clifton’s argument rested 
on the premise that the absence of pre-compliance judicial review was not a fatal flaw for section 41.49. 
Id. at 1070–71. The majority’s analysis, according to Judge Clifton, led only to the conclusion that sec-
tion 41.49 would not qualify for the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 
1072. Additionally, Judge Clifton criticized the majority for concluding that the lack of pre-compliance 
review was unreasonable per se without performing the requisite Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
analysis. Id. As such, he noted that the court record lacked any evidence indicating that the Patels, in fact, 
possessed an expectation of privacy in these business records. Id. The majority’s logic was simply based 
on the notion that businesses are expected to keep such information as private; therefore, the Patels treat-
ed their records as private information. Id. at 1072–73 (stating “[w]e cannot simply assume that hotels 
in general expect information contained in their guest registers to be private . . . . The majority opin-
ion’s construction is missing a foundation”). 
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particularly for minority populations of limited English-speaking ability who 
must deal directly with police officers’ inspection demands.62 The Ninth Cir-
cuit en banc’s holding protects motel patrons, albeit indirectly, from police of-
ficers’ unchecked discretion in implementing searches with the goal or conse-
quence of targeting individual guests.63 As the majority opinion noted, stand-
ard Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not allow individuals to assert their 
own privacy interests in information they voluntarily turn over to a third par-
ty.64 Guests’ lack of standing, however, does not diminish expectations regard-
ing enforcement of standard procedural safeguards, which are designed to curb 
arbitrary targeting.65 This decision furthers these expectations by actually en-
forcing the application of standard procedural safeguards with regard to motel 
guest records.66 
Under the original section 41.49 ordinance, for example, the police were 
free to use the warrantless seizure provision to obtain information on current 
guests, run background checks without their knowledge, and proceed to harass 
them in search of a crime.67 This occurred in Cormier, where police in the 
State of Washington used motel records to run background checks on occu-
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Patel v. City of Los Angeles (Patel II), 738 F.3d 1058, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), 
135 S. Ct. 400 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2014) (No. 13-1175). 
 63 See Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1062, 1065. 
 64 See id. at 1062. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id. at 1062, 1065. One commentator contended that: 
The effect of [section 41.49’s] logic is that Americans cannot travel without waiving 
privacy rights to personal details as intimate as where we go, the times we arrive and 
leave, who stays with us in our room, and how many beds are inside that room. If the 
state is permitted to seize all that information without probable cause or a warrant, the 
Fourth Amendment is worthless, at least if the same logic is extended to other business-
es. After all, most people can’t function in modern American society without revealing 
virtually every aspect of their lives to some “third party” or other. 
Conor Friedersdorf, A Hotel’s Right to Protect the Privacy of Its Guests, ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2014, 
12:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/10/a-hotels-right-to-protect-the-privacy-of-
its-guests/382122/. 
 67 See Patel II, at 1062; United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). In an 
analysis concerning a pending California bill addressing guest privacy interests in hotel registries, the 
Assembly Judiciary Committee cited an incident involving a married couple in San Luis Obispo, Cali-
fornia, where the police spotted a car resembling a stolen vehicle in a hotel parking lot and demanded 
the owner’s information from the guest registries. ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 2007 LEGIS. BILL 
HIST. CA A.B. 429, at 3. After obtaining the information, the police broke into a married couple’s 
room, tazered the husband, placed them in handcuffs, interrogated the couple, and held them for over 
an hour before concluding that they were not the robbers. Id. The Assembly Judiciary Committee 
noted that “[t]he presumption is that if the police had been required to get a search warrant, they 
would have been a little more careful to ensure they had sufficient evidence to believe the hotel guests 
were the robbers.” Id. 
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pants and then proceeded to target an individual with a criminal record.68 This 
interaction led to a search of the defendant’s hotel room, the discovery of a 
weapon, and his arrest.69 The Patel holding inserts necessary pre-compliance 
judicial review, and therefore a level of reasonability, which decreases police 
incentive to target individuals without probable cause.70 Generally, this is in 
line with the Fourth Amendment policy articulated in Katz regarding protec-
tion of individuals from unreasonable government intrusion.71 
The control on police discretion also protects hotel and motel owners 
from indiscriminate harassment by the police.72 The Patels asserted that they 
were subjected to three searches and were under threat of further police intru-
sions.73 Other hotel and motel operators similarly commented that their main 
objection was not towards the validity of section 41.49, but rather its abusive 
application that intruded upon their private residences, and took advantage of 
their limited English-speaking capabilities.74 Without the opportunity to chal-
lenge the searches’ reasonableness, the Patels—and other hotel operators—
could conceivably be subjected to unending section 41.49 warrantless searches 
or, as a result of non-compliance, face penalty after penalty.75 By requiring a 
warrant, however, police officers must first demonstrate to a judge that their 
demands are reasonable.76 Consequently, motel owners are provided with a 
level of predictability and consistency concerning police inspection of their 
records.77 
Finally, the dissenting opinions disregarded general Fourth Amendment 
policy by concluding that the mere option of obtaining a warrant prior to a sec-
tion 41.49 search validates the ordinance as a whole.78 As the Supreme Court 
noted in Katz, the Fourth Amendment’s main objective is protecting people, 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Cormier, 220 F.3d at 1106–07, 1108; see Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1061 (explaining that those who 
possess or control property have the right to exclude others from that property, and therefore, also 
have a right to privacy). 
 69 Cormier, 220 F.3d at 1106–07. 
 70 See Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1061, 1063 (explaining that those who possess or control property 
have the right to exclude others from that property, and therefore, also have a right to privacy). 
 71 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1063; Cormier, 220 
F.3d at 1108 (holding guests do not have expectation of privacy in hotel records). 
 72 See Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1063–64. 
 73 See Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 12–13. 
 74 David G. Savage, L.A. Wants Court to Revive Law Allowing Motel Guest Registry Searches, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-court-la-motels-20140928-story.html. 
In an interview, Frank A. Weiser, attorney for the motel and hotel owners challenging section 41.49, 
noted that “most proprietors were willing to cooperate, but there were complaints about abuses. Some-
times police conducted inspections late at night and went into the family quarters . . . . [M]any owners 
are Asians and some had a limited command of English. ‘They felt intimidated by the police.’” Id. 
 75 See Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1064–65; Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 3, at 12–13. 
 76 See Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1063–64. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1065 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
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which can reasonably be understood as barring inappropriate use of govern-
ment discretion.79 There is no safeguard against an abuse of discretion, howev-
er, if a statute simply maintains the option of obtaining a warrant prior to a 
search.80 Unlike the result under the majority approach, police would not face 
meaningful judicial oversight, leaving them free to proceed without challenge 
against vulnerable minority populations.81 Thus, the majority properly recog-
nized the harm in the unbridled discretion given to the Los Angeles police, and 
correctly struck down the ordinance.82 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision not only grants hotel owners a safe-
guard against discriminatory application of section 41.49, but also gives indi-
rect privacy protections to hotel guests. By recognizing section 41.49’s need to 
provide for optional pre-compliance judicial review, the majority took a step 
towards curbing police officers’ arbitrary, unmonitored application of the stat-
ute. In turn, this provides a disincentive for targeting individuals, as officers no 
longer have direct, uncontested access to hotel registries. Finally, hotel owners 
have the opportunity to avoid multiple automatic misdemeanor penalties by 
opposing a record search. All of this, of course, is in line with the Fourth 
Amendment’s goal of protecting people from arbitrary search and seizure. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 20, 2014, and heard 
oral arguments on March 3, 2015. In deciding the case, the Court should fol-
low the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which recognizes the Patel’s inherent privacy 
interest in their property, regardless of its statutorily mandated creation. In do-
ing so, the Court would continue to protect hotel and motel owners from the 
arbitrary use of police discretion and interference with their industry in a man-
ner that opportunistically circumvents Fourth Amendment protections and ju-
risprudence. 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1064 (majority opinion). 
 80 See Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1064–65; id. at 1065 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 81 See Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1065 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 82 Patel II, 738 F.3d at 1065 (majority opinion). 
